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ARGUMENT 
Canyon Cove provides a variety of attacks on Broderick's argument that the 
exculpatory provision is void as against public policy. Canyon Cove maintains that clear, 
unambiguous, exculpatory provisions are enforceable. This is not in dispute. However, 
much of their brief avoids discussing or analyzing the viability of exculpatory clauses in 
light of public policy concerns. Rather, Canyon Cove accuses Broderick of presenting 
"red herrings" and attempting to play on "sympathy." If Broderick et. al were truly 
interested in making an irrelevant emotional play for sympathy, they would have detailed 
the death of Ms. Byrd, a tenant and victim of Canyon Cove's negligence. (R. 3270). 
Rather, Broderick focused on facts showing Canyon Cove's negligence and 
analyzing those facts as weighed against enforcement of an exculpatory clause in 
residential leases. Broderick provided the Court with legal analyses using those facts to 
consider the public policy ramifications of immunizing Canyon Cove through an 
exculpatory clause. Canyon Cove, by contrast, addresses only one point in the analytical 
framework used to determine whether an exculpatory provision may shield them from 
liability for their own negligence, namely, whether residential leases are adhesion 
contracts. Ultimately, Canyon Cove cites only three legal authorities in their brief and 
avoids any meaningful discussion of whether or not exculpatory clauses should, as a 
matter of public policy, be allowed to immunize landlords from liability for harm to 
others occasioned by the landlord's own negligence. 
1 
I. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS REQUIRE INVALIDATION OF 
CANYON COVE'S EXCULPATORY PRO VISION. 
Over 45 years ago this Court acknowledged the substantial trade-off between 
enforcing a contractual exculpatory provision and the ability of such a provision to 
undermine incentives to act with due care. Union Pac. R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., held that "the law does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve 
himself of the basic duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of using due care for 
the safety of himself and others."1 The court stated that such exculpatory provisions 
"tend to encourage carelessness and would not be salutary either for the person seeking to 
protect himself or for those whose safety may be hazarded by his conduct."2 Yet, Canyon 
Cove suggests that this appeal seeks "a dramatic departure from long standing Utah 
law."3 However, Broderick et. al. seek only to apply long standing principles to reach the 
same conclusion an "increasing number"4 of other courts reach: exculpatory provisions in 
residential leases are void as against public policy. 
1
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 259, 408 P.2d 910, 
913-14(1965). 
2
 Id 
3
 (Appellee's Brief at 11). 
4
 Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 469-70 (Cal. 1978)(citations 
omitted); see, also, Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tenn. 1992)("we 
conclude that the exculpatory clause in the residential lease in this case is contrary to 
public policy. In reaching this conclusion, we join a growing number of states."). 
2 
A. Canyon Cove Failed to Maintain Areas and Instrumentalities 
Exclusively Within Their Control. 
First, Canyon Cove claims that broken fire alarms, malfunctioning fire prevention 
doors and a known history of fires and inadequate fire blocking, are attempts by 
Broderick to introduce a 'red herring' into the case and/or garner 'sympathy' from the 
Court. Canyon Cove claims that "Tenants attempt to sway the sympathy of this court by 
listing issues such as prior fires on the property, problems with fire detector and the 
presence of the couch."5 
Contrary to Canyon Cove's assertion, these facts demonstrate negligence 
sufficiently to have resulted in denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by Canyon 
Cove. These facts are not cited in an attempt to 'sway sympathy.' Rather, Canyon 
Cove's negligence in caring for areas under their exclusive control must be weighed 
alongside the practical implications of immunizing them from liability for harm due to 
that lack of care. 
B. Canyon Cove's Exculpatory Clauses Offends Well-Settled Public Policy 
Considerations. 
Broderick's primary argument on appeal is that the exculpatory provision violates 
public policy considerations and must be invalidated on that basis. Canyon Cove's only 
attempt to directly address the public policy analysis involves the assertion that the lease 
is not an adhesion contract.6 Whether or not the lease is an adhesion contract focuses on 
5
 Appellee's Brief at 6. 
6
 Appellee's Brief at 9-10. 
3 
only one of the six Tunkl factors to be considered in determining if the exculpatory clause 
should be invalidated on public policy grounds. Further, consideration of the Tunkl 
guidelines in finding a provision void as to public policy "is a flexible endeavor; the 
activity at issue need exhibit only a sufficient number of Tunkl characteristics such that 
one may be convinced of the activity's affinity to the public interest."7 Residential leases 
and the provision of shelter clearly constitute a sufficient 'affinity to the public' interest to 
gamer scrutiny from a public policy perspective. Accordingly, whether or not the lease is 
an adhesion contract does not end the analysis. 
Based on the briefing, it remains largely uncontested that five of the six Tunkl 
factors are met here as follows: (1) residential leases remain a business type subject to 
regulation;8 (2) the landlord/property owner provides a service of great public 
importance, i.e. a basic necessity of shelter; (3) landlords/property owners generally hold 
themselves out as willing to provide this service for any member of the public who seeks 
it and, under fair housing regulations, cannot discriminate in any event;9 (4) because the 
landlord/property owner provides the essential service of housing to those who cannot 
afford a bank loan or others in need of short term housing, the landlord also holds a 
significant advantage in bargaining strength; and, (6) the tenant and their property are 
7
 Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,116, 171 P.3d 442: 447, 590 
8
 See, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-801, Forcible Entry and Detainer (West 2010) el 
seq., and, Utah Code Ann. § 57-22-1, Utah Fit Premises Act (West 2010) et. seq. 
9
 See, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601, etseq. (West 2010). 
4 
placed under the control of the landlord, subject to the risk of landlord carelessness in 
failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition. 
Under factor (5) of the analysis, landlords rent their properties using a 
standardized lease agreement, written by them to meet their needs and offered to the 
financially weaker party, the tenant, on a take it or leave it basis. Further, to the extent 
that the single factor of 'adhesion' bears on a public policy analysis of the exculpatory 
clause, most courts recognize the modern residential lease as a contract of adhesion.10 
Utah authority recognizes that an adhesion contract "is defined as a contract entered into 
between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a 
standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and 
offered to the weaker party on a 'take it or leave it basis."11 
Canyon Cove's own briefing supports the fact that a residential lease is a 'take it 
our leave it' proposition. "Surely, Tenants could have rented apartments at any of the 
other apartment complexes in the area."12 Canyon Cove essentially admits that they offer 
the lease on a take it or leave it basis while ignoring the fact that tenants would just as 
surely have been presented with the same or substantially similar lease agreements at 
other locations. Finally, reflecting the boiler plate nature of their lease, Canyon Cove 
10
 Taylor v. Leedy & Co., Inc., 412 So. 2d 763, 766 (Ala. 1982)("the modern 
standard form lease is in essence an adhesion contract."); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W. 
2d 754, 758 (Tenn. 1992)("a residential landlord confronts the public with a standardized 
adhesion contract.") 
11
 Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
12
 See, Appellee's Brief at 10. 
5 
offers only one exemplar lease as addendum to their brief. Even if 'adhesion' were the 
only factor to be considered under a public policy analysis, that factor has been 
demonstrated in this case. 
A complete analysis of all the Tunkl factors cements the proposition that, as a 
matter of public policy, an exculpatory clause contained in a residential lease should be 
found void. 
C. Canyon Cove's Negligence Provided Both the Opportunity for Arson 
and the Ability of the Fire to Spread Once Begun. 
Finally, Canyon Cove argues that because the fire was 'caused by' an intentional 
act of arson, the exculpatory clause should not be struck down as violating public policy 
concerns. However, the act of arson does not eliminate liability for Canyon Cove's own 
negligence and does not alter any of the factors used to evaluate the validity of the 
exculpatory clause. At best, this line of argument raises an issue of comparative fault, an 
issue that must be resolved by the finder of fact.13 
As noted in Broderick's opening brief, the landlord's duty is not to prevent the 
crime which brings about injury or harm, but to take steps which minimize the 
occurrence of the crime or the damage which results. In Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., 
the plaintiff brought a claim for injury following a fire set by a serial arsonist. The trial 
court dismissed the claim. The appellate court overturned the dismissal, finding that "[a]s 
we see it, appellees and the circuit court misapprehended the nature of appellant's claim, 
13
 See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-817 through 820 (West 2010). 
6 
which was not based on a duty, if any, to prevent the arsonist from setting the fire, but 
rather on a duty to maintain the Property so as to minimize the danger to its occupants 
from fires that might occur."14 
Broderick offered several case authorities and analysis regarding the interplay 
between third party criminal acts, negligence of the landlord, and the ability to use an 
exculpatory provision to shield the landlord from liability. Canyon Cove chose not to 
respond to this argument or offer any authorities to the contrary.15 It remains 
uncontroverted that, free of the deterrent effect of liability for negligence, landlords may 
no longer take the necessary and reasonable steps to provide a safe environment. By 
eliminating or reducing the incentive to act with due care, exculpatory clauses work to 
the injury of tenants, their guests, firemen, police and other emergency personnel who 
may be required to respond to a poorly maintained and hazardous property, a property 
which provides fertile ground for crime to occur, or fires to spread more rapidly. 
Accordingly, the exculpatory clause in this case offends sound notions of public health, 
safety and welfare and should be invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Broderick respectfully requests that exculpatory clauses 
contained within residential leases be found void as against public policy and that the 
dismissal based on such exculpatory provision be reversed. 
14
 Rivers v. Hagner Mgrnt. Corp., 959 A.2d 110, 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
15
 "Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate briefing." 
Coleman ex rel Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 17 P.3d 1122, 1124. 
7 
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